What would an existentialist society look like?

209 Part 5 Emancipatory Existentialism 210 211 Chapter 13 Camus: The Revolt Against State and Revolution Although the existentialist triumvirate Ŕ Camus, Sartre, de Beauvoir ger came into conflict with one another from the late 1940s onwards and Camus became increasingly politically his own from then on For almost a decade they embodied the core of French existentialism, which provided the Resistance with a philosophical foundation. Camus' great novel The Stranger was finished around the time the Germans invaded France. But that means that it was completed under the threat of war. He describes a colonial state as dumb as it is cruel, which has pre-fascist features, which Camus had experienced in Algeria and which drove him into the Communist Party. Together with The Myth of Sisyphus, Der Fremde was published in 1942 under German censorship. The fact that Camus, in the face of its hopelessness, propagated the rebellion as a general human fate, when the worker had to go back to work every day, was simply necessary to hide a philosophy of resistance from the eyes of the German censors. 1. Resistance in the face of hopelessness The widespread pessimism such as in the case of Cioran, who in 1936 extolled the mystical motto “Either die or suffer” (CBM 59), should not come as a surprise, thus not that Camus (1913-1960) at the beginning of the myth of Sisyphus raises the question of whether life is worthwhile, whether suicide is not advisable. For intellectuals, artists, for people who, like homosexuals, wanted to live differently, there was no longer a peaceful place in the world that was characterized by cruelty, authoritarianism and firmly established social roles, a world that forced people into a mechanized life wasted in war. The stranger reacts to this world of imperialist states with indifference, even when he is interrogated by the public prosecutor: “At first I didn't take him seriously. He received me in a room with the curtains closed. There was a lamp on his desk, the light of which fell on the armchair in which he sat me while he remained in the dark. I had already read a similar description in books, and everything seemed like a game to me. ”1 1 Camus, Der Fremde (1942), 65 212 In other respects, too, the state takes from the individual through the ideologies that support him To shape life yourself. The Catholics, the Liberals, the Communists and the racists, but also the moderates: all "reasonable comprehensive teachings" 2 Ŕ to speak with John Rawls Ŕ but even more the unreasonable, they all know how the world works. If you believe them, the world loses its absurd face and becomes understandable. You refrain from tracing reality, do not get tangled up in contradictions and no longer need to worry about many things, in any case you do not have to rebel against reality if you engage in such supervised thinking: the paternalistic state makes people into Subject, relieves him of the burden of life as well as the burden of thinking. One no longer feels the absurd when one takes on such supervised thinking or one shifts the problem with it. Camus: “So I understand why the doctrines that explain everything to me weaken me at the same time. They free me from the weight of my own life, and I still have to endure it alone. ”(CAM 50) But many people do not want to get involved. Therein lies the truth of the absurd contemporary who holds on to an often lonely struggle with all his effort: rebellion against an absurd reality! But the absurd reality does not primarily present itself as a structural state of affairs. Then she might drive one or the other thinker to suicide: Otto Weininger in 1903 or Carlo Michelstaedter in 1910, both at the age of 23 in the middle of an unbroken militarized and familial society. How does the feeling of absurdity grasp him in everyday life? At Michelstaedter it was parents and society. In France in 1941 the occupying power, which is still supported by narrow-minded and thoughtless fellow men Ŕ by people probably similar to Michelstaedter's parents Ŕ a previously widespread "strange, thoroughly authentic inability to think" (AZV 128), the Arendt is diagnosed much later with Eichmann, who, however, is already alienating the stranger Meursault. In view of the arguments of the public prosecutor and his defense lawyer, how did he notice: “In a certain way it looked as if the whole matter had nothing to do with me.” 3 There is a deep rift between the individual and the state. Merseult, who like Michelstaedter still embodies a world before the Resistance, the world of the turn of the century or the existentialism of the thirties, which functioned brutally and disciplining beyond Nazism and the Germans. For the almost absent, who kills more by chance, his indifference is interpreted as brutality by fascist judges, Arendt's decent family fathers. He deviates from social conventions that bore him. During the trial against him Meursault remarks: “But with 2 Rawls, Politischer Liberalismus (1993), 159 3 Camus, Der Fremde (1942), 98 213, I had nothing to say. Incidentally, I have to admit that the interest in using others for me does not last long. For example, the prosecutor's pleading soon bored me. ”4 Meursault refuses to enter into official discourse, which in the eyes of state representatives degrades him to a monster. The state prescribes the way of life and behavior and follows up every deviation that its authorities notice Ŕ think of the employment agency, which used to fall under the category of “welfare”, or the abused children in care. Michelstaedter still complains about a lack of himself, Meursault no longer. He can no longer find anything in himself, is no longer surprised at what aggravates his position as an outsider and thus makes the gap to the Nazis unbridgeable. Such attitudes will liberalize Western societies towards the end of the century, conjuring up a new totalitarian enemy, crypto-fascist religious fundamentalism in all religions. The Nazis in particular did not tolerate any deviation from the norm and executed people to an unprecedented extent, whether in Germany through the judiciary or in the occupied countries: the stranger embodies their victims and his apathy corresponds to the hopelessness of the situation in which one finds oneself in a brutal Nazi contaminated or in a state-militarized, patriarchal or familial world, the prosecutor ends his plea with the words: “If I had to demand the death penalty during my long career, I have never had the feeling, as I do today, that this embarrassing duty made up for it , was balanced and enlightened by the awareness of an imperious and holy command, by the loathing of a human face in which I only read horrific things. ”5 Because Meursault gave his mother to the home, did not know her age and did not cry at her grave. That is, in the language of Adorno, The Stranger reveals what ideology tries to conceal, namely socially produced suffering, the guarantee of which is the state, which ensures that this suffering is continued and does not end: For early existentialism, whether with Michelstaedter, In Der Ekel or Der Fremde, the state is the producer of suffering, which Horkheimer and Adorno will emphasize again in 1947 in their Dialectic of Enlightenment: “The absurdity of the state in which the power of the system over people increases with every step that leads them out of the violence of nature, denounces the reason of reasonable society as obsolete. ”6 The militarized society of the 19th century slips over the catastrophe of the First World War into a totalitarian form of government that is spreading at great speed. Their advance overwhelmed their contemporaries physically and psychologically, the world was ruled for a time by sheer misfortune, in which Ŕ as 4 Camus, Der Fremde (1942), 98 5 Ibid., 102 6 Horkheimer, Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklerung (1947), 38 214 Hannah Arendt notices Ŕ the brutal and cruel forces always prevail and rewrite history in their minds. At no other time in world history did violence seem so worthwhile as in the 1930s, including the so-called lightning wars. The fact that Camus emphasizes the hopelessness of the rebellion in the figure of Sisyphus is due to the time of its creation, when the Germans were at the height of their power and it was impossible to foresee how long this rule would last. Anyone who wanted to call for resistance in France in 1941 found hardly any friends or colleagues who would join him. What effect could one expect from a resistance against an overpowering opponent? “First of all, I just want to talk about a world in which thought and life are robbed of any future.” (CAM 61) For people who do not want to submit to submission and submission, the situation simply turns out to be desperate. There is no end in sight. Any actions to improve the situation are either doomed to failure or collaborate with a murderous regime that abandons or has taken into service all traditional ethical orientations. This is the absurd state of affairs: “But in a universe that is suddenly deprived of illusions and light, man feels alien. There is no escape for him from this being rejected because he is robbed of memories of a lost homeland or of hope for a promised land. This dichotomy between man and his life, between the actor and his background is actually the feeling of absurdity. ”(CAM 11) It is the situation of the stranger, which now presents itself as a general fate that nobody escapes: Either with make a deal with the devil or hopelessly oppose him! Why should one do the latter? All thinking doesn't help. Reason does not provide a way out; on the contrary, it only shows the limits within which one must move. “The absurd is the enlightened reason that establishes its limits.” (CAM 45) A rebellion against it appears to be absolutely hopeless precisely from a rational point of view, which led Jaspers to inactivity. This is an absurd situation that is owed to the time of Nazi rule as well as to the epistemological status quo, i.e. the loss of metaphysical insanity and the fragility of the natural sciences, which offer no support against totalitarianism - which has been confirmed to this day. For someone who sees himself in the specifically French tradition of reason, only one absurd situation arises. Reason only shows blocked paths, so none more. One must be aware of this with all clarity: “The only thinking that liberates the spirit is that which leaves it alone in the certainty of its limits and its imminent end.” (CAM 96) What remains? Help is not to be expected. Traditional morality provides it no more than reason. Every idea is doomed to fail. Whatever one starts when one does not want to submit, only opens up gruesome perspectives: “No morality and no strivings can be justified a priori in the face of the bloody mathematics that rules over us.” (CAM 19) Even this insight shows but no way out. The violence to which one sees oneself at the mercy of German occupation does not offer any legitimation for the use of any counter-violence, which is also doomed to failure. Camus certainly thinks of the consequences of acting, so, like Sartre, thinks ethically. Just to set a heroic signal that will result in a brutal response, an act of resistance is far from legitimized: “The absurd does not liberate, it binds. It does not justify all actions. ”(CAM 60) Nonetheless, nothing remains but resistance or rebellion against this absurd situation. That is why Camus falls back on the ancient myth of Sisyphus, whom the gods condemned to a senseless activity that he has to repeat indefinitely. But Sisyphus chose his own fate. So he has an alternative, which is of course spiritual in nature and which does not free him from his fate, but which he can interpret differently than the gods imagined. What remains for him is to despise the gods and his destiny. You don't have to submit to the most brutal occupiers. Just by despising them, you resist them. This is how Camus writes the decisive sentences: Sisyphus "" Knowledge that was supposed to cause his actual torment, at the same time completes his victory. There is no fate that cannot be overcome through contempt. ”(CAM 99) This overcomes all forms of submission. You can rebel, yes you have to. It is an imperative to be honest with yourself. Precisely for this reason, Camus, in his 1947 novel The Plague, did not declare the resistance to be a question of heroism: "This thought can seem ridiculous, but the only way to fight the plague is honesty." 7 You resist a criminal regime even if it has no prospect of success. The worst tyrant cannot prevent that. That's what he's most afraid of. This is why it is not a general human situation, as Martin Meyer would like to suggest: “But what makes the novel so ambiguity is that it brings the existential to the collective far beyond that, something that is universally valid that can be effortlessly emerged from the confusion epochal catastrophes can be resolved. ”8 The supposed existential owes itself to a terrorist rule either by the Nazis or, as in Der Fremde, by an authoritarian state. Bataille announces this in his diary of the German invasion of France: "The train in which I am writing arrives in a region that the bombs struck on Monday: insignificant but insidious pustules, the first signs of the plague." 9 What Camus formulates existentially Rather, that is the philosophy of resistance, even before Sartre said: “The fight against summits can fill a human heart. We have to imagine 7 Camus, Die Pest (1947), 98 8 Meyer, Albert Camus, 76 9 Bataille, Die Freunde (1944), 71 216 Sisyphus as a happy person. ”(CAM 101) This reveals the freedom of the individual , that is, in the rebellion that no tyrant can prevent, which always remains an individual option. All imposed alienation falls away from you. In this way, a life that one has to lead as a stranger offers an astonishing, namely vivid perspective: "Feeling one's life, one's rebellion and one's freedom as strongly as possible Ŕ that means: living as intensely as possible." (CAM 56) It lies only in the individual himself, who, due to the fatal external situation, does not find any help from institutions or the tradition of thought, least of all religious. The individual is left to fend for himself, but is thus set free. This is Camus "philosophy of resistance:" One of the few philosophically sound positions is accordingly the rebellion. It is a constant confrontation of man with his own darkness. It is the claim to an impossible transparency. It questions the world every second. ”(CAM 49) Despite the hopelessness, nothing remains but the rebellion against an absurd situation that has blocked all perspectives. The rebellion has no point in what man knows. The world offers no clarity, no hope and the individual cannot imagine this. Precisely because of the hopelessness rejecting all religious consolation as well as every historical-philosophical consolation nevertheless the individual only has the rebellion. Nonetheless, the absurd contemporary is free, but not in a metaphysical sense, i.e. not in the sense of Augustine's freedom of the Christian, just as little as a member of a sovereign nation - one has even less of that - or as a well-cared for member of a welfare state who gains free time as a result or doesn't have to cure himself because doctors do it for him. Freedom is realized individually and thus eliminates metaphysical problems. Because “either we are not free and Almighty God is responsible for evil.Or we are free and responsible, but God is not omnipotent. ”(CAM 51) This scholastic antinomy can be transferred to the state: Either the citizen is not free, then the top political and economic leaders are responsible for everything. That is how Max Weber, Leo Strauss and Carl Schmitt still see it. Or the citizen is mature and responsible for himself, then the elites cannot switch the way they want Ŕ apart from the fact that neither a god nor the Chancellor can successfully implement plans. Camus distances himself from state structures: “I have lost my sense of hierarchy.” (CAM 51) In Der Mythos von Sisyphus, Camus develops a concept of responsibility that replaces the orientation towards the highest norms with consideration for the foreseeable consequences. Camus thus anticipated the conceptions of Sartre and de Beauvoir in 1942: Man is free and therefore responsible for his life. Sartre writes: "What happens to me happens to me through me, and I can neither be worried about it, nor rebel against it, nor come to terms with it." (SSN 950) The individual 217 is fully responsible for his own existence, which he cannot can deport. But it is precisely because of this individual self-responsibility that he is able to rebel against the most brutal tyrant: the philosophy of emancipation and resistance: existentialism as a political philosophy that proceeds from the individual, not from the state and not from the community. That is why political philosophers like Strauss and Voegelin or analytical philosophers like Rawls and Otfried Höffe would not recognize it as a political philosophy. Conversely, French existentialism in the tradition of de Sade and Stirner questions the latter position: Politically, not only the actions of the state institutions, but also, as with Arendt, the activities of the citizens in public relate to public, especially state affairs thus hinder the state's work, change it or even provoke it in the first place. Camus has anticipated the civil protests since the 1970s. But those who defend themselves against the plague are often precisely those who have previously quarreled with the police or moral order, similar to how Hannah Arendt describes it. Camus says goodbye to the traditional ethics of subordination and postulates a radical ethics of individual maturity in the spirit of Nietzsche. 2. Revolutionary terror and state violence The fact that Camus is a political philosopher and not an apolitical person, that he designs a political existentialism, perhaps more political than Sartre, but similarly political and foresighted as de Beauvoir, is proven by his second major philosophical work L'Homme révolté Ŕ the German translation The man in the revolt does not correspond to the meaning of the French title. In defending the revolt against the revolution, Camus is not only contradicting the leading political thinkers from right or left, who all demand the effectiveness of political action, either the final revolution or the decision on a state of emergency, always a strong state. But, according to Camus, the revolting citizens fight for and defend justice and freedom, not the revolution and not the state. While de Beauvoir, with Le Deuxième Sexe in 1949, paved the way for the emancipation of women, the politically most sustainable emancipation movement of the 20th century, Camus anticipates that mature, revolting citizen who has no longer admired state authorities since the 1970s, but instead challenges them in protest although such a rebellion often still seems hopeless and its successes sometimes come much later. So he provokes above all the Marxists, who are critical of capitalism and the bourgeois state and above all hope for the revolution that will finally end the state-sanctioned suffering: What is a revolt that notoriously fails and that does not sustain the situation? able to change? That the revolution is resorting to violence is a truism that does not make revolutionaries ache. Against this background, how could the revolt be more important? And say goodbye to the revolution? So it is not surprising that L’Homme révolté caused heads to shake among left-wing intellectuals. This explains why Camus is understood by conservative intellectuals to this day as someone who is interested in a revolt against the conditio humana, i.e. a general human characteristic and situation that has little to do with a reaction to the social and political situation have to do. Is L’Homme révolté really not political and Camus “philosophy not political? Does politics only exist when it comes to the revolution or the friend-foe distinction, about an understanding of the world Ŕ e.g. militant Islamism? Do people not pursue politics who defend themselves, protest or revolt against their living conditions? Camus does not associate resistance and revolting thinking with consistently positive effects. Rather, he has to admit that this always results in ambivalent processes, not only when the revolt accelerated by the social movement of the 19th century is transformed into revolutionary movements and finally into the totalitarian regimes of the 20th. In L’Homme révolté, for example, Camus writes a cultural and political history of the revolt, which at the same time results in the system of resistant thinking that does not just celebrate success. Georges Bataille will follow up on this when he stated in 1953: “There has never been a great revolution that was supposed to overthrow an established bourgeois rule. All upheavals arose from a revolt directed against feudal society. ”(BAK 257) Ironically, Camus - but in numerous and good company - follows Marx's interpretation of the French Revolution that the bourgeoisie - already in possession of economic power - seized political power . The Marxist theory of revolution falls apart if Pierre Bourdieu is right and the French Revolution was one of the jurists, of the nobility, who already held political power in their hands, but economic power hardly played a role. Then the primary basis of the class struggle in the economy is no longer correct, and a proletarian revolution loses its historical-philosophical background. Bourdieu notes: “All the debates about the French Revolution as a bourgeois revolution are false debates. I think that the problems that Marx posed about the state, the French Revolution, the revolution of 1848 had catastrophic consequences because they were imposed on everyone who thought about the state in every country. ”10 But Bourdieu's interpretation supports Camus “Criticism of the Revolution. If the revolution reveals itself as an illusion precisely from the perspective of 10 Bourdieu, Über den Staat (1989-92), 600 219 Bourdieus, then nothing remains but the hope of a revolt when the state leaves the age of imperialism and totalitarianism At most it can meet very limited expectations: rather a democratic chaos without end than an imperial downfall. Camus, too, has already criticized the common ideas of the French Revolution. As with Rousseau, under the sign of the revolution, power owes itself to the treaty to which everyone agrees. “The Contrat social spreads the new religion, of which reason is God, and develops its dogmatics; reason is not distinguished from nature, and the representative of the new God on earth is instead of the king the people, grasped in their collective will. ”(CAH 94) Rousseau's Volonté générale is moral because she always wants what is good for the political body in which every citizen is absorbed. He wrote in 1755: “The political body is therefore also a moral being that has a will. And this common will, which is always aimed at the preservation and well-being of the whole and of every part and which is the source of the law, is for all members of the state in relation to them and to it the rule of the just and the unjust. " 11 Kant derives his principle of generalizability from this. In this sense, Kant stated four years before the French Revolution: "It is not possible anywhere in the world, yes, in general, to think apart from it, what could be considered good without restriction other than a good will alone." 12 This is what Saint wants -Just, the ascetic who took Sparta as his model and dreamed of a nation as revolutionary as it was vegetarian, to govern only according to reason: “As he thinks, statecraft has only produced monsters because before that one did not govern according to nature wanted. The time of the monsters is over, at the same time as that of violence. 'The human heart moves from nature to violence, from violence to morality. (...) Our goal is to create such an order of things that a general inclination for the good arises. "" (CAH 100) For now a state is emerging that is based on laws that express the general will. His power thereby gains absoluteness, he declares the citizens to be free, although they are forced to take a certain action: whoever obeys the law is free, he obeys himself after all. Virtue and politics coincide in this way. And how does Saint-Just proclaim: "Either virtue or terror." (CAH 102) Therefore, the republic of forgiveness, which Saint-Just dreamed of before, tips over into the dictatorship of horror. The revolutionary state is falling into violence and will disappoint all hopes placed in it. This has political consequences for Camus: “As a matter of fact, Rousseau was the first to establish the civil creed. He was the first to justify the death penalty in a bourgeois society and the absolute submission of the un- 11 Rousseau, Treatise on Political Economy (1755), 15 12 Kant, Foundation for Metaphysics of Morals, (1785), 393 220 tertan under the royal power of sovereign people. ”(CAH 95) The understanding of democracy that prevails in 1950 is about the governability of the state, in which the opposition should remain without influence, while they almost dismiss a citizen who is outside the institution as an enemy of the state. A new religion of the general will demands unconditional obedience and worship and relies unrestrainedly on the scaffold to enforce it. Because, as a general will in the sense of Rousseau, justice tolerates no other principle besides itself. Therefore, Danton and Saint-Just did not want to condemn the king, they wanted to kill him. The king's defenders demanded that the people confirm the death sentence. But Saint-Just follows the logic of Rousseau: the will of everyone, according to Rousseau, the will of the majority, whether in a parliament or in a referendum, may, unlike Socrates or Jesus of Nazareth, sometimes show pity. However, this is by no means the general will, which for its part, like a merely punitive God, cannot forgive because he is not allowed to, who only coolly calculates and enforces the common good and is therefore entitled to demand every sacrifice in order to avoid the common good through grace Suffers damage. Saint-Just portrays the king as a rebel against the people and the general will. There can be no contract between the people and the king which a court can help judge. The people embodies the truth and the king embodies the crime, who is not one of the citizens who are bound by a treaty. The king, according to Camus, stands for the revolutionaries outside the treaty. The general will and natural virtue are called into question at the moment when an opposing party positions itself. Saint-Just therefore fights against all who endanger the unity of the nation, the aristocrats as well as the republicans. So he outlines Ŕ Anticipating Carl Schmitt Ŕ the principle that all tyrannies of the 20th century will follow: "A patriot is whoever supports the republic as a whole, whoever fights it in detail, is a traitor." (Cited CAH 103) Der Usage of words Saint-Justs is like a frenzy, but a reasonable one. Marat, who wants to let a few heads roll in order to save many, expresses himself similarly. Unfortunately the few were incredibly many. And he also considered himself a philanthropist. “The red flag, the symbol of martial law, ie the executive under the Ancien Régime, becomes a symbol of the revolution on August 10, 1792.” (CAH 107) Martial law no longer allows revolt, it separates it from the revolution. The revolting man and the state of emergency become the opposites of the century. The former creates a state of emergency for the state, but the state declares it in order to be able to fight the revolt. The revolt, on the other hand, insists on justice, which can only be achieved through the law that the state is currently abolishing in a state of emergency. Joseph de Maístre criticizes Jacobinism and Calvinism and seeks reconciliation in the Catholic spirit. Carl Schmitt refers to him: “Every sovereignty acts as if it were infallible, every government is absolute. (...) De Maístre (...) Declares (...) The government as such to be good, 221 if only it exists: tout gouvernement est bon lorsqu ‟il est établi.” 13 With this de Maístre is similar for Camus quite Marx, and proves to be a pupil of Saint-Just: “When Maístre takes up Bossuet's strong thought: 'He is a heretic who has his own thoughts', ie ideas that are not based on any social and religious tradition, he is speaking with it the oldest and youngest formula of conformism at the same time. ”(CAH 156) The principle of revolt is turned into servitude, the principle of revolution. Marx also wants to abolish capitalism and establish a new order that will demand the same conformism Ŕ Camus diagnoses similar structures in Rousseau, Saint-Just, de Maístre and Marx, which separate all revolution or government from revolt by adopting a subject ethic develop that should nip every revolting spirit in the bud from the outset. For Marx, socialism is not justified ethically, but economically and historically. While Robespierre relies on violence to realize virtue, Marxist revolutionaries use violence to promote progress. It is not violence per se that turns out to be Camus' problem, but rather the departure of revolutionary practice from the ethical roots of revolt. For Marx, the philosophy of history takes on the role of ethics, which seems to be confirmed by political events. The east just turned red in 1951, the satellite states of the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong's China. Everywhere in the colonized countries there are liberation movements, most of which have a socialist character - a development that will continue until the end of the Vietnam War and which, apart from various smaller conflicts, only occurred with the failure of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan 1980s ends: Marxism will fail because of Islam. Bataille sums it up as follows: “It is to the great merit of Albert Camus that he has clearly shown that a revolution without war is not possible, at least not a classic revolution. But there is no need (...) To see the politics of the Kremlin as the work of evil. To wish for the expansion of a regime based on a secret police, the gagging of thought and numerous concentration camps is cruel. ”(BAV 230) Capitalism has learned to deal with social conflicts and is intensifying the“ Moloch State ”for this purpose. Marx dramatically underestimated capitalism's ability to reform. The welfare state creates other than revolutionary dependencies. The growing complexity of technologies and thus of production removes the individual worker from the possibility of control and decisive participation in production that Marx still had in mind: the decisive fact for the proletariat to take power after the collapse of capitalism. Rather, as Camus says in 1950, a new layer of technicians emerged, which subverted the dichotomy of class society. 13 Schmitt, Politische Theologie (1922), 60 222. The pauperization of large sections of the population does not represent a revolutionary potential for Marx, at most one for revolt, as Stéphane Hessel said in his appeal Outraged! 2010 shouted to marauding young people mainly in the French suburbs: “We, the veterans of the resistance movements and the fighting groups of Free France, call on the young people to fill the spiritual and moral legacy of the Resistance with new life and to pass on their ideals.Get involved, get outraged! ”14 But poverty revolts do not unleash any revolutions, at least not those that bring the proletariat to power, rather fascisms, fundamentalisms or banal military dictatorships, which in the 20th century both in the political discourse as in the state Practice played an important role, which they largely forfeited at the beginning of the 21st. At the beginning of the 20th century, the revolutionaries increasingly wanted to implement their ideas of the revolution. Lenin does not wait for the industrialization of Russia. Rather, the idea of ​​the revolution and the revolutionary state comes to the fore, if these are raised to the highest value. In the end, the life of the individual is no longer worth anything, rather it can be sacrificed without hesitation. The professional revolutionaries of the 20th century take high risks themselves. But they no longer sacrifice themselves like many Russian anarchists. The seizure of power takes the place of the spirit of revolt. Lenin founds an organization that is tightly run militarily. “Caesarian socialism undoubtedly condemns individual terrorism